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Abstract: Economic convergence has long been a declared objective of the EU and considered the
fundamental mechanism for achieving socioeconomic cohesion. The recent economic crisis had
an uneven impact across EU countries and brought a halt to the process of economic and social
convergence. In response to this situation, the Europe 2020 strategy, launched in 2010, aimed to deliver
social and territorial cohesion in the Member States. In this paper we evaluate the poverty and social
exclusion pillar of the Europe 2020 strategy by analysing whether it has promoted convergence across
the EU countries in the indicators devised to capture risk of poverty, severe material deprivation,
and the number of persons living in households with very low work intensity. Our results for all
three rates indicate that convergence occurs in heterogeneous clubs that do not follow a geographic
east-west or south-north pattern. Convergence within each club, especially for the severe deprivation
rate, takes place by means of a catching-up process, with Eastern European levels converging on the
Western levels. Finally, not only is there club convergence, but there is no tendency for the clubs to
convergence. Poverty and social cohesion indicators show a multi-speed Europe, casting doubt on
the sustainability of the overall convergence process in the EU.
Keywords: EU integration; social cohesion; sustainability; convergence; Europe 2020
1. Introduction
Economic convergence is a real, long-term phenomenon directly related to growth processes,
occurring when lower-income economies grow faster than higher-income economies so that the former
catch up with the latter [1]. Convergence is achieved if the catching-up process persists over time.
Furthermore, in an integrated area, such as the EU and most importantly the euro area, the sustainability
of convergence over time is necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the area. As was made clear
during the euro area crisis, unsustainable convergence eventually results in financial instability and
sovereign debt levels rising beyond market limits [2]. The sustainability of the convergence process
appears as an essential element for the full materialisation of the benefits attained through being a
member of an integrated economic area.
Recognising the importance of promoting convergence, the EU promptly developed policies
aimed at enhancing economic convergence. The Structural Funds were established in 1975, and in
1993 the Cohesion Funds were implemented. However, despite these efforts, the empirical literature
still finds a lack of real convergence between the European Union (EU hereafter) and the European
Monetary Union (EMU hereafter) countries. Monfort et al. [3] conclude that for the EU-14 member
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states, northwestern, southern and central-eastern European countries have converged to different
equilibrium levels in income per capita. This club convergence is a possible form of conditional
convergence, whereby economies belonging to a group of countries share similar features. Similarly,
Alcidi et al. [4] claim that income convergence in real GDP per capita in the EU is a tale in two parts,
with large internally divergent patterns that translate into the emergence of geographical clusters.
Evidence of club convergence may indicate divergence in a group of countries and cast doubt on
the sustainability of the integrated area. Ordóñez et al. [5] conclude that, after years of ever-closer
economic integration, EMU countries have also converged to different steady states in competitiveness,
measured as real unit labour costs, and in capital accumulation and total factor productivity. According
to these authors, the fact that EMU countries have converged to different long-run equilibrium levels in
terms of the growth drivers (capital accumulation and total factor productivity) points to the fact that
the imbalances at the root of the euro crisis are related to the specificities of the growth model in the
periphery and core European countries. Their results allow them to conclude that ‘EMU has not been
the cause of the external imbalances and the resulting sovereign-debt crisis ( . . . ). Rather, it has boosted
some structural divergencies that were already present in the growth model of these economies’ [5].
Similarly, Díaz del Hoyo et al. [2] also find that total factor productivity is the key driver of convergence
and that the differences in productivity between southern European countries and the higher-income
countries existed long before the introduction of the euro. According to Monfort et al. [6], a lack of real
economic convergence can also be observed in income inequality and unemployment.
In the EU context, convergence goes beyond the economic sphere. Convergence has been always
an explicit objective of the EU, as formulated in Article 130a of the Single European Act in 1986, and has
been considered a fundamental mechanism to achieve socioeconomic cohesion [4]. While promoting
economic growth (and productivity) has always been an EU policy target, much emphasis is now
being placed on the social dimension of the EU. The economic crisis had an uneven impact across
the EU countries, making it necessary to strengthen socioeconomic growth and convergence in order
to preserve and consolidate the integration process and to prevent public disaffection with the EU
project. It is widely accepted that ‘social and economic convergence go hand in hand’ [7] and both
dimensions of convergence are important to guarantee the sustainability of the EU as an integrated
area. The need to support social convergence alongside economic convergence is currently at the top
of the EU political agenda.
As a consequence, in March 2010, the European Commission launched the Europe 2020 strategy
‘for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ [7] in the EU to prepare the integrated area for the
challenges of the next decade. The strategy aims to foster a high-employment economy and to promote
productivity and a more competitive economy based on knowledge and innovation. The ultimate
goal is to deliver social and territorial cohesion in the Member States while reducing the impact on
the natural environment through a more resource-efficient and greener economy. These objectives
are defined in terms of eight targets in the areas of employment, research and development, climate
change and energy, education and poverty reduction. A set of nine headline indicators and additional
subindicators enable the monitoring of progress towards the overall targets and an assessment of how
far the EU still has to go to reach them.
This paper aims to assess the poverty and social exclusion pillar of the Europe 2020 strategy
by analysing convergence in the poverty and social exclusion indicators of this strategy [8], that is,
in the components of the AROPE indicator. The poverty reduction target aims to reduce the number
of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by 20 million by 2020, compared with the 2008 level.
At risk of poverty or social exclusion is defined in the Europe 2020 strategy as the sum of persons who
are either at risk of poverty, or severely materially deprived or living in a household with a very low
work intensity. These three dimensions of poverty constitute the headline indicators for the social
exclusion pillar of the Europe 2020 strategy. Eurostat (2019) [9] presents the progress of the EU and its
Member States towards the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy. According to this report, the target on
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poverty alleviation is still far from being achieved. In 2018, the reduction in people at risk of poverty
and social exclusion for the EU-28 was 7.156 million persons: a long way off the objective of 20 million.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper constitutes the first attempt to assess the Europe 2020
strategy on poverty and social exclusion targets in terms of sustainable convergence. The existence of
convergence clubs would reveal asymmetries in the socioeconomic performance of Member States,
pointing towards the idea of a multi-speed Europe and casting doubt on the sustainability of the
social cohesion in the EU. We evaluate the existence of clubs in poverty and social exclusion indicators
by applying the methodology proposed by Phillips and Sul [10,11] which enables us to distinguish
different paths of convergence among the various heterogeneous economies involved in a convergence
process. This heterogeneity is modelled through a nonlinear time-varying factor model, which provides
flexibility in studying idiosyncratic behaviours over time and in cross section. Our empirical findings
reveal the existence of convergence clubs, thus calling into question the sustainability of social cohesion
in the EU.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a discussion on
the relevant theoretical literature as well as the channels through which economic integration can
cause real divergence. Section 3 presents the methodology used, while Section 4 describes the data
under analysis. Section 5 reports our empirical findings and finally, Section 6 summarises and provides
concluding remarks.
2. Economic Integration and Convergence
The theoretical basis for the existence of convergence can be found in the neoclassical growth
models originally set out by Solow [12] and Swan [13], which predict conditional income convergence.
In this theoretical framework, convergence occurs when the growth rate of an economy is positively
related to the difference between the economy’s initial level of income and its own steady state.
Bénabou [14] points out that the neoclassical growth model predicts convergence in income per capita
not just in the first moment, the mean, but also in higher moments, such as the variance. According
to this author, “Once augmented with idiosyncratic shocks, most versions of the neoclassical growth
model imply convergence in distribution: countries with the same fundamentals should tend towards
the same invariant distribution of wealth and pretax income” [14]. This means that the neoclassical
growth models predict convergence not only in income per capita but also in income inequality.
Convergence in income level and income distribution are closely related. Quah [15] explores the
link between convergence in income per capita and income distribution, concluding that economic
convergence is not just about the aggregate level of income, but also about how this income is
distributed across countries. According to this author, what matters for convergence is the relative
performance of poor and rich economies or, in other words, how economic progress occurs differently
in poorer economies than in richer ones. The traditional question about convergence between rich and
poor countries’ needs, therefore, to be respecified in terms of convergence between poorer and richer
economies, and between high- and low-inequality economies. The prediction of income and income
distribution convergence and the link between both mechanisms, as stressed by Quah [15], constitutes
the theoretical basis for the convergence in social exclusion and poverty indicators.
There is abundant literature on testing for convergence in the EU, both at national [3,5,6] and at
regional level [16–19]. Unsurprisingly, most of the literature rejects overall convergence in favour of
cluster convergence. Monfort et al. [6] provide an insightful explanation of the reasons why economic
integration in the EU has not translated to overall real economic convergence. As pointed out by
these authors, in a neoclassical world with rational agents, perfect information, perfect competition,
and full mobility of production factors, economic integration should lead to economic convergence.
Although the European integration process has continuously attempted to make progress in these
dimensions by enhancing transparency, competition, and factor mobility, there are three potential
channels for divergence. First, the existence of real economic divergence is related to the impact of
economic integration in terms of macroeconomic governance. According to Croci and Farina [20],
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the macroeconomic governance of the EU, and in particular the Eurozone, far from promoting real
convergence, has magnified and mutually reinforced imbalances, exacerbating real divergences through
endogenous asymmetric shocks [21]. Also, the lack of reform in national markets, the differing speeds,
and the varying scope of such reforms could explain the existence of divergences between Eurozone
countries. Second, divergence can also be the result of new mechanisms that arise from the interaction
of markets at a microeconomic level. Greater integration may lead to activity specialization and
economic agglomeration [22] and, in turn, differential growth across countries, affecting income
distribution and intensifying inequalities between countries. Furthermore, greater specialization can
also increase vulnerability to asymmetric shocks [23]. Third, and closely related to the indicators on
social exclusion and poverty we analysed in this paper, divergence can also be explained by changes in
the public redistributive capacity. Economic integration can set in motion new sources of inequalities
that will require the implementation of new redistribution policies not included in the traditional
welfare state, in order to offset the negative effects of market deregulation and greater factor mobility
and competitiveness. Also, broader markets improve efficiency because they provide individuals
with a wider range of choices; at the same time make it more difficult to implement redistribution
policies [24].
3. Methodology
The time series approach to convergence analysis can be found in the seminal papers by
Carlino and Mills [25] and Bernard and Durlauf [26,27]. These authors developed the concept of
stochastic convergence, based on the stationarity properties of the variables under analysis. Thus, two
nonstationary variables converge if there is a cointegrating relationship between them. In other words,
two nonstationary series converge if they share the same stochastic trend.
This definition of convergence can be empirically tested by means of time series econometric
techniques. However, as pointed out by Phillips and Sul [11], traditional convergence tests are
inadequate when technology is heterogeneous across countries and the speed of convergence is
time-varying. To account for temporal and transitional heterogeneity, Phillips and Sul [10,11]
introduced cross-sectional and time series heterogeneity in the parameters of a neoclassical growth
model. The starting point for the test is the following time-varying representation:
Xit = δitµt, (1)
where Xit is the dependent variable observed across i = 1,2, . . . ,N individuals over the period
t = 1,2, . . . ,T. δit. is an idiosyncratic time-varying factor loading capturing convergence to a common
factor µt, which represents the common stochastic trend in the panel. In other words, δit. measures
the share of the common factor µt each individual in the panel experiences. The simple econometric
representation in (1) can be used to analyse convergence by testing whether the factor loadings δit.
converge. The idiosyncratic element is defined as:
δit = σiεitL(t)
−1t−α, (2)
where σi. is fixed, σi > 0, and εit. is i.i.d (0,1) across i, but weakly dependent on t (these conditions
imply that the stochastic component declines asymptotically so that the trend vanishes and each
coefficient converges to δit). and L(t) is a slowly varying function for which L(t) tends to infinity as t
also goes to infinity).
The null hypothesis of convergence can be written as Ho : δit = δ and α ≥ 0. against the alternative
of no convergence HA : δit = δ ∀i and α < 0. The alternative hypothesis includes divergence but
can also include the possibility of club convergence. For example, if there are two convergent clubs,
the alternative is:
HA : δit →
{
δ1 and α ≥ 0, i f i ∈ G1
δ2 and α ≥ 0, i f i ∈ G2, (3)
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where G stands for a specific club.
Phillips and Sul (2007) show that these hypotheses can be statistically tested by means of the
following ‘log (t)’ regression model:
log (H1/Ht) − 2 log (log (t)) = a + b log (t) − ut (4)
for t = [rT], [rT] + 1, . . . , T with some r > 0, L(t) = log (t + 1), bˆ = 2aˆ and H1/Ht is the cross-sectional
variance ratio defined as Ht = 1N
∑N
i=1(hit − 1)2 and hit = Xit1
N
∑N
i = 1 Xit
= δit1
N
∑N
i = 1 δit
which measures the
loading coefficient δit in relation to the panel. The variable hit. is called the relative transition path
and traces out an individual trajectory for each i relative to the panel average. The regression is
run starting at t = [rT], which is the integer part of rT for some fraction r > 0. Phillips and Sul [10]
recommend using r = 0.3. Rejection of the null implies that there is no overall convergence, but there
may be cluster convergence. The convergence patterns within groups (that is, the existence of club
convergence and clustering) can be examined using log (t) regressions. The so-called ‘core group’, Gk,
is chosen by maximising tk. over k individuals according to the criterion: K∗ = argmax{tK}, subject to
min{tk} > −1.65.
The convergence approach proposed by Phillips and Sul [10] presents a number of clear advantages.
First, it is a test for relative convergence, as it measures convergence to some cross-sectional average,
in contrast to the concept of level convergence analysed by Bernard and Durlauf [27]. Second, this
approach outperforms the standard panel unit root tests, since in the latter case Xit −X jt may retain
nonstationary characteristics even though the convergence condition holds. In other words, panel
unit root tests may classify the difference between gradually converging series as nonstationary. As a
further problem, a mixture of stationary and nonstationary series in the panel may bias the results of
unit root tests. Finally, sometimes these test results are not particularly robust. This is in contrast to the
Phillips and Sul [10] test, which does not depend on any particular assumption concerning the trend
stationarity or stochastic nonstationarity of the variables to be tested.
4. Data
The Europe 2020 strategy indicators for the at-risk-of-poverty rate, the severe material deprivation
rate and the number of persons living in a household with a very low work intensity as a percentage of
total population have been taken from the Eurostat database, Europe 2020 indicators on EU policy
tables. According to Eurostat, the at-risk-of-poverty rate is defined as the share of people with an
equivalised disposable income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is
set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers. The indicator
persons living in households with very low work intensity is defined as the number of persons living
in a household where the members of working age worked less than 20% of their total potential
during the previous 12 months. Material deprivation refers to a state of economic strain and to certain
durables. It is defined as the enforced inability (rather than the choice not to do so) to pay unexpected
expenses, afford a one-week annual holiday away from home, have a meal involving meat, chicken or
fish every second day, adequately heat a dwelling, pay for durable goods such as a washing machine,
colour television, telephone or car, as well as facing payment arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills,
hire purchase instalments or other loan payments).
The sample covers the years 2005 to 2018 and contains Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom.
Figures A1–A3 in the Appendix A plot the data. With the exception of the severe material
deprivation rate, there is no evidence of a reduction in the dispersion across countries when comparing
the beginning and the end of the sample, indicating the absence of overall convergence. However,
this does not preclude the existence of club convergence. As can be seen in Figure A1, a group of
Sustainability 2020, 12, 1843 6 of 22
eastern (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and southern (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) EU
countries present values for the at-risk-of-poverty rate that are above the mean for the whole sample.
Likewise, a group of eastern (Czechia, Slovenia, and Slovakia) and northwestern (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Finland, and the Netherlands) EU countries present a lower at-risk-of-poverty
rate than the mean. Regarding the number of persons living in households with very low work
intensity—Figure A2—Ireland, Greece, Spain, Belgium, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, and Italy
present the highest rates, whereas eastern countries such as Estonia, Czechia, Poland, Slovenia, and
Slovakia have a rate below the panel average throughout the sample, as is also the case with Austria,
Luxembourg and Sweden. Figure A3 plots the data for the severe material deprivation rate: the worst
performers are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and Lithuania. As can be seen, there is
no clear distinctive pattern in terms of the poverty and social exclusion indicators between western
and eastern countries; for each of the indicators, eastern countries can be found in both the best and
the worst performers groups. In contrast, it seems that there is a north-south divide; Bulgaria, Greece,
Italy and Spain appear at least twice on the list of worst performers.
Tables A1–A3 in the Appendix A present the descriptive statistics for all three indicators. For all
three indicators, both the mean and the end values of show a marked disparity between countries.
The highest mean values in the at-risk-of-poverty rate indicator are concentrated in eastern and
southern European countries, while the lowest are in central and northern European countries.
However, the minimum value for the entire sample of countries is reported for Czechia, with 8.6%,
while Latvia registers the maximum value, with 26.4%. Regarding the number of persons living in
households with very low work intensity, Ireland registers a noteworthy mean value of 18.56%, almost
triple that of the lowest mean value of 6.03% reported for Luxembourg. On the other hand, there does
not seem to be a clear geographical pattern in terms of the distribution of the values of this indicator;
the highest and lowest mean values are found in both eastern and western countries, and in both
the north and the south. Lastly, the severe material deprivation rate indicator presents the greatest
variability of all the indicators. The highest mean value is 41.61% for Bulgaria, while the lowest is
for Luxembourg with 1.27%. Bulgaria also presents the highest value of all those registered, with
57.7%, whereas Luxembourg records the lowest, with 0.5%. Analysis of the descriptive statistics for
the three indicators indicates that there is no clear geographical pattern in countries’ performance in
poverty and social exclusion indicators. The possible convergence clubs can thus be expected to be
fairly heterogeneous, and do not reveal an east-west or north-south pattern.
5. Empirical Results
The club convergence test developed by Phillips and Sul [10,11] is applied to the three indicators
for poverty and social exclusion. These authors have proven that eliminating the cyclical components
of the data improves the power and size of the club convergence test in finite samples. Therefore,
we have eliminated the cyclical components by means of the HP filter [28]. The test for overall panel
convergence is rejected for all three indicators with a log t-stat of −65.74, −21.76, and −25.77 for the
at-risk-of-poverty rate, the number of persons living in households with low work intensity percentage
and the severe deprivation rate, respectively. The absence of convergence for the panel leads us to
consider the possible existence of club convergence.
Table 1 presents the results for the club convergence analysis. Overall convergence can be rejected
in favour of club convergence, with the analysis identifying six, four and six clubs, respectively, for the
at-risk-of-poverty rate, the number of persons living in households with low work intensity percentage
and the severe deprivation rate. The composition and heterogeneity of the clubs corroborates our
findings based on the descriptive statistics. Given that the clustering procedure tends to find more
groups than may actually exist, we have tested whether adjacent clubs can be merged into larger
groups. Table 2 shows the results. According to the results, for the at-risk-of-poverty rate, the first
and second clubs can be merged, as can the third and fourth clubs. Regarding the number of persons
living in households with low work intensity percentage, the third and the fourth club can be merged,
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Finally, for the severe deprivation rate, the first and second clubs are merged, as are the fourth and
fifth. The final composition of the clubs is shown in Table 3.
Table 1. Club analysis (2005–2018).
At-Risk-of-Poverty Rate after Social Transfers
Log t t Statistic Clubs
0.019 0.572 First club:Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain, and Sweden
0.574 2.009 Second club:Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg
0.082 1.693 Third club:Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom
0.344 1.770 Fourth club:Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Slovenia
−0.115 −0.920 Fifth club:France and Slovakia
1.547 1.176 Sixth club:Denmark and Finland
- -
No club convergence:
Czechia
People Living in Households with Very Low Work Intensity
Log t t Statistic Clubs
0.444 1.301 First club:Greece, Ireland, and Spain
−0.174 −1.001
Second club:
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
0.453 1.089 Third club:Austria, Hungary, and Luxembourg
0.131 0.369 Fourth club:Malta and Slovenia
0.620 3.201 Fifth club:Czechia, Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia
Severe Material Deprivation Rate
Log t t Statistic Clubs
−0.061 −0.500 First club:Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, and Lithuania
0.036 0.205 Second club:Italy, Latvia, and Spain
0.503 3.154 Third club:Belgium, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom
0.002 0.010 Fourth club:Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, and Slovenia
0.401 1.429 Fifth club:Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands
0.367 1.406 Sixth club:Finland and Luxembourg
- -
No club convergence:
Sweden
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Table 2. Testing for club merging (2005–2018).
At-Risk-of-Poverty Rate after Social Transfers
Log t t Statistic Clubs
0.040 0.487 Club 1 + 2
−0.491 −10.172 Club 2 + 3
−0.064 −0.707 Club 3 + 4
0.061 0.435 Club 4 + 5
−0.970 −9.582 Club 5 + 6
−0.742 −6.665 Club 6 + 7
People Living in Households with Very Low Work Intensity
Log t t Statistic Clubs
−0.787 −9.806 Club 1 + 2
−0.405 −2.553 Club 2 + 3
0.101 0.285 Club 3 + 4
−0.518 −9.049 Club 4 + 5
Severe Material Deprivation Rate
Log t t Statistic Clubs
−0.330 −3.518 Club 1 + 2
−0.151 −1.587 Club 2 + 3
−0.215 −2.336 Club 3 + 4
−0.061 −0.335 Club 4 + 5
−0.276 −1.615 Club 5 + 6
Table 3. Final club analysis (2005–2018).
At-Risk-of-Poverty Rate after Social Transfers
Log t t Statistic Clubs
0.040 0.487
First club:
Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Spain,
and Sweden
−0.064 −0.707
Second club:
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom
−0.115 −0.920 Third club:France and Slovakia
1.547 1.176 Fourth club:Denmark and Finland
- -
No club convergence:
Czechia
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Table 3. Cont.
People Living in Households with Very Low Work Intensity
Log t t Statistic Clubs
0.444 1.301 First club:Greece, Ireland, and Spain
−0.174 −1.001
Second club:
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
0.101 0.285 Third club:Austria, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia
0.620 3.201 Fourth club:Czechia, Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia
Severe Material Deprivation Rate
Log t t Statistic Clubs
−0.061 −0.500 First club:Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, and Lithuania
−0.151 −1.587
Second club:
Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and
the United Kingdom
−0.061 −0.335
Third club:
Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Slovenia
0.367 1.406 Fourth club:Finland and Luxembourg
- -
No club convergence:
Sweden
To offer some insight into the logic behind the formation of the most heterogeneous clubs,
Figures 1–6 present the radial graphs for each of these clubs, showing four values for each country
belonging to the club: the initial value, in 2005; the value in the year the Europe 2020 strategy was
adopted, 2010; 2012, to see what might be the effect of the crisis, and the final value, in 2018. Figure 1
shows the first convergence club for the at-risk-of-poverty rate indicator. This club is characterised
by having a 2018 value for this rate of between 16% and 22%, and in general there is no substantial
variation between the initial value in 2005 and the end one in 2018. The club is primarily composed of
eastern and southern European countries. Although the inclusion of Luxembourg and Sweden in this
club might seem surprising, in fact these countries, despite starting in 2005 with at-risk-of-poverty rate
levels notably lower than the other countries in the club, performed much worse from then until 2018.
This is especially true for Sweden, though both these countries show levels similar to the rest of the
countries of the club in 2018. The graph also shows that Greece performed badly as a consequence of
the crisis.
Figure 2 shows the second convergence club for the at-risk-of-poverty rate indicator. This club
includes countries with a rate of between 13% and 17% in 2018. It is a very heterogeneous club
containing countries from central, eastern and southern Europe. Countries such as Belgium, Cyprus,
Hungary, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia show very little variability between 2005 and 2018 values.
During the period under analysis, Ireland and Poland have achieved a significant reduction in the
at-risk-of poverty rate, registering levels of around 15% in 2018. Conversely, Germany is the worst
performing country, reporting an increase in this rate from 2005 values of around 12% to a final value
of 16%.
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Figures 3 and 4 show the radial graphs for the second and third clubs for the indicator number
of persons living in households with very low work intensity. The second club displays values for
this rate of between 8% and 12% for 2018, while the third club presents values of between 5% and 8%.
Furthermore, both clubs are characterised by a marked dispersion between the initial and end values
of the indicator for all countries. Both clubs are made up of central, eastern and southern European
countries. The second club is characterised by a high dispersion in the initial values: the highest value
for 2005 is recorded for Belgium with 15.1%, compared to the lowest value of 4.4% for Cyprus. This
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initial dispersion is balanced out by the progress of the countries that started out with higher rates
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia, and the United Kingdom) and the poor performance of those
with lower values at the outset (Cyprus). Regarding the third club, the convergence occurs partly
because of the sharp drop in the rate registered by Slovenia, but fundamentally due to Hungary and
Malta. Luxembourg, on the other hand, performs poorly with its rate increasing by 2.5%, bringing it
close to the levels reported for Austria.
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Figures 5 and 6 present the radial graphs for the second and third clubs corresponding to the
severe material deprivation rate indicator. In 2018, the second club shows values for this rate of
between 5% and 9%, while the third club presents values of between 3% and 5%. In the second club,
three countries from eastern Europe—Latvia, Poland and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia—have undergone
a marked process of sustained convergence over time, bringing them in line with the levels achieved
by the western European countries with which they share the club. With perhaps the only exception of
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Malta, all the western European countries included in the club present very similar values for this rate
over the three years considered; as such, convergence is achieved entirely through the three eastern
economies catching up to the levels of their western European counterparts. Something similar can
be observed in the third club, where Denmark, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, France and
Germany show similar values between 2005 and 2018, meaning that convergence is achieved through
the sharp reduction in the severe material deprivation rate in the eastern economies, with a particularly
intense decline in Czechia and Estonia. Figure 5 also shows how the crisis severely hit countries as
Italy and Ireland.
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From the analysis thus far, it can be concluded that, although there are clubs that are geographically
fairly homogeneous, such as the first club for the number of persons living in households with very
low work intensity indicator and for the severe material deprivation rate, in general the clubs do not
reveal a clearly defined north-south or east-west geographical pattern. In addition, the clubs for the
at-risk-of-poverty rate indicator show less dispersion between the initial and end values than those
for the other two indicators. Lastly, it can be seen—very clearly in the case of the severe material
deprivation rate—that convergence occurs through the countries from the east of Europe converging
on those of the west. Thus, convergence is mainly the result of a process of eastern European countries
catching up to the levels of western European ones.
Figures 7–9 plot the transition paths for each of the three indicators of poverty and social exclusion.
These graphs show the performance of each club relative to the panel average. Thus, a declining
transition path of the corresponding indicator for a given club cannot be interpreted as a decrease in
the absolute value of this indicator, but rather as a decrease in the indicator relative to the average
behaviour of the whole panel, represented in the figure by the value of 1. Therefore, these graphs are
a useful way to gauge the degree of divergence among clubs and to determine when, and for how
long, this divergence takes place. Divergence among clubs is clear in all three indicators. Thus, not
only is there club convergence, but there is no tendency for the clubs to convergence. Poverty and
social cohesion indicators show a multi-speed Europe, casting doubt on the sustainability of the overall
convergence process in the EU.Sustainability 2020, 1, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of 22 
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6. Conclusions
Economic convergence has long been a declared objective of the EU and considered the fundamental
mechanism for achieving socioeconomic cohesion. The sustainability of this convergence process is
necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the integrated area. The recent economic crisis increased
the divergence between Member States not only in economic outcomes, but also in social aspects,
such as working and living conditions. In March 2010, the European Commission launched the Europe
2020 strategy to promote smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the EU. This initiative aimed to
strengthen the EU economy and enhance social convergence alongside economic convergence.
This paper assesses the poverty and social exclusion pillar of the Europe 2020 strategy by testing
whether convergence across EU Member States has increased in the three headline indicators of
this pillar: at-risk-of-poverty rate, number of persons living in households with low work intensity,
and severe material deprivation rate. If national objectives in poverty and social exclusion headline
indicators of the Europe 2020 strategy are being achieved, convergence should be observed across
the EU countries. However, it may be the case that convergence is observed not for all Member
States, but rather for a group of countries sharing similar features, with the possible emergence of
geographical clusters. This convergence in groups is referred to as club convergence in the literature,
and it is a possible form of conditional convergence. The existence of convergence clubs would reveal
asymmetries in the socioeconomic performance of Member States, pointing towards the idea of a
multi-speed Europe and casting doubt on the sustainability of the social cohesion in the EU. We evaluate
the existence of clubs in poverty and social exclusion indicators by applying the methodology proposed
by Phillips and Sul [10,11].
Three conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, convergence in poverty and social indicators
takes place in form of clubs. Overall, the clubs are heterogeneous and do not display a geographic
east-west or north-south pattern. Second, convergence in each cluster usually takes place by means of
a catching-up process, with the eastern countries converging on their western counterparts. Third,
the different clubs in each indicator are diverging from one another. This divergent behaviour reflects
the existence of a multi-speed Europe with very different success in achieving poverty reduction and
enhancing social inclusion. This divergent pattern calls into question the sustainability of the overall
convergence process in the EU.
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics: At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers (2005–2018).
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 2018
Austria 13.97 0.92 12 15.2 14.3
Belgium 15.17 0.52 14.6 16.4 16.4
Bulgaria 21.37 1.44 18.4 23.4 22
Cyprus 15.50 0.54 14.4 16.2 15.4
Czechia 9.45 0.51 8.6 10.4 9.6
Denmark 12.19 0.50 11.7 13.3 12.7
Estonia 19.47 1.92 15.8 21.9 21.9
Finland 12.62 0.80 11.5 13.8 12
France 13.35 0.42 12.5 14.1 13.4
Germany 15.44 1.39 12.2 16.7 16
Greece 20.80 1.32 18.5 23.1 18.5
Hungary 13.77 1.20 12.3 15.9 12.8
Italy 19.50 0.62 18.4 20.6 20.3
Ireland 16.35 1.34 15 19.7 15.6
Latvia 21.84 2.34 19 26.4 23.3
Lithuania 20.62 1.40 18.6 22.9 22.9
Luxembourg 15.27 1.71 13.4 18.7 18.3
Malta 15.5 0.84 14.2 16.8 16.8
Netherlands 11.17 1.16 9.7 13.3 13.3
Poland 17.30 1.40 14.8 20.5 14.8
Portugal 18.46 0.68 17.3 19.5 17.3
Slovenia 13.03 1.11 11.3 14.5 13.3
Slovakia 12.2 0.86 10.6 13.3 12.4
Spain 20.89 0.88 19.7 22.3 21.5
Sweden 14.4 2.20 9.5 16.4 16.4
United Kingdom 17.22 1.14 15.9 19 17
Table A2. Descriptive statistics: People living in households with very low work intensity (2005–2018).
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 2018
Austria 7.92 0.55 7.1 9.1 7.3
Belgium 13.66 1.07 11.7 15.1 12.1
Bulgaria 11.47 2.71 6.9 16 9
Cyprus 6.70 2.71 3.7 10.9 8.6
Czechia 6.95 1.25 4.5 8.9 4.5
Denmark 10.42 1.06 8.5 12.2 11.1
Estonia 7.22 1.68 5.2 10 5.2
Finland 9.65 1.07 7.5 11.4 10.8
France 8.79 0.62 8 9.9 8
Germany 10.57 1.43 8.1 13.6 8.1
Greece 12.23 4.45 6.6 18.2 14.6
Hungary 10.83 2.56 5.7 13.6 5.7
Italy 11.05 0.90 9.2 12.8 11.3
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Table A2. Cont.
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 2018
Ireland 18.56 4.02 12.9 24.2 16.2
Latvia 8.66 2.29 5.4 12.6 7.6
Lithuania 9.22 1.84 6.1 12.7 9
Luxembourg 6.03 0.90 4.7 8.3 8.3
Malta 8.71 1.23 5.5 9.9 5.5
Netherlands 9.34 0.79 8.2 10.9 8.6
Poland 7.99 2.53 5.6 14.3 5.6
Portugal 8.55 2.08 6 12.2 7.2
Slovenia 7.16 0.97 5.4 8.7 5.4
Slovakia 6.56 0.91 5.2 7.9 5.4
Spain 11.38 3.90 6.4 17.1 10.7
Sweden 8.24 1.03 6 9.4 9.1
United Kingdom 11.78 1.16 10.1 13.2 10.1
Table A3. Descriptive statistics: Severe material deprivation rate (2005–2018).
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 2018
Austria 3.89 0.76 2.8 5.9 2.8
Belgium 5.68 0.49 4.9 6.5 4.9
Bulgaria 41.61 11.05 20.9 57.7 20.9
Cyprus 12.62 2.25 9.1 16.1 10.2
Czechia 6.48 2.22 2.8 11.8 2.8
Denmark 2.94 0.51 2 3.7 3.4
Estonia 6.72 2.46 3.8 12.4 3.8
Finland 2.89 0.53 2.1 3.8 2.8
France 4.97 0.48 4.1 5.8 4.7
Germany 4.65 0.76 3.1 5.5 3.1
Greece 16.32 4.67 11 22.4 16.7
Hungary 20.37 4.68 10.1 27.8 10.1
Italy 9.57 2.60 6.4 14.5 8.5
Ireland 6.59 1.82 4.5 9.9 5.2
Latvia 22.38 8.41 9.5 39.9 9.5
Lithuania 17.27 5.84 11.1 32.6 11.1
Luxembourg 1.27 0.43 0.5 2 1.3
Malta 6.07 2.53 3 10.3 3
Netherlands 2.31 0.48 1.4 3.2 2.4
Poland 14.62 8.38 4.7 33.8 4.7
Portugal 8.93 1.29 6 10.9 6
Slovenia 5.67 0.89 3.7 6.7 3.7
Slovakia 11.47 4.17 7 22.1 7
Spain 5.07 1.09 3.5 7.1 5.4
Sweden 1.66 0.47 0.8 2.3 1.6
United Kingdom 5.37 1.49 3.3 8.3 4.6
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